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ABSTRACT 
NASA formed the NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
in 2003 following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident.  
It is an Agency level, program-independent engineering 
resource supporting NASA’s missions, programs, and 
projects.  It functions to identify, resolve, and 
communicate engineering issues, risks, and, particularly, 
alternative technical opinions, to NASA senior 
management. The goal is to help ensure fully informed, 
risk-based programmatic and operational decision-
making processes.  To date, the NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC) has conducted or is actively 
working over 600 technical studies and projects, spread 
across all NASA Mission Directorates, and for various 
other U.S. Government and non-governmental agencies 
and organizations. Since inception, NESC human 
spaceflight related activities, in particular, have 
transitioned from Shuttle Return-to-Flight and 
completion of the International Space Station (ISS) to 
ISS operations and Orion Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle 
(MPCV), Space Launch System (SLS), and Commercial 
Crew Program (CCP) vehicle design, integration, test, 
and certification.  This transition has changed the 
character of NESC studies.  For these development 
programs, the NESC must operate in a broader, system-
level design and certification context as compared to the 
reactive, time-critical, hardware specific nature of flight 
operations support. 
 
1. CREATION AND PURPOSE 
The Space Shuttle Columbia accident occurred on the 
morning of February 2, 2003 in the skies over Texas.  
NASA immediately formed an accident investigation 
board, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board or 
CAIB. As the investigation progressed, the CAIB 
Chairman provided briefings and updates to NASA, the 
U.S. Congress, and the American public.  On one such 
occasion in July 2003, speaking publically following a 
Congressional briefing, the CAIB Chairman stated  
 
“The safety organization sits right beside the 
(Shuttle) person making the decision, but behind the 
safety organization there is nothing there, no people, 
money, engineering, expertise, analysis … there is 
no ‘there’ there.” 
 
NASA responded within weeks to this statement 
announcing in late July 2003 the formation of the NASA 
Engineering and Safety Center or NESC.  The NESC was 
to be operational by the end of 2003, and provide the 
NASA Safety and Mission Assurance Director and the 
NASA Chief Engineer with the independent engineering 
capability the CAIB had pointed out publically was 
missing. 
 
NASA’s traditional safety philosophy of 
 
 Strong in-line checks and balances 
 Healthy tension between organization elements 
 Value-added independent assessment 
 
defines the NESC’s role relative to the technical 
functions of the inline engineering organizations that 
support NASA programs and projects.  Using its own 
funds, the NESC performs independent analyses and 
testing to bring challenging or confirming data to 
complex technical issues, and provides or supports 
alternative viewpoints on program or project technical 
decisions. If necessary, the NESC can and does make 
these alternative viewpoints known to the highest levels 
of NASA management, including the Administrator, to 
help make sure NASA’s development and operational 
decisions are fully risk informed.  The NESC vision is to 
be a high-performance, world-class technical resource 
routinely sought out by NASA’s programs, projects, and 
organizations for its ability to provide timely, value-
added solutions to difficult problems. 
 
2. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION 
The NESC is organizationally part of the NASA Chief 
Engineer’s Office supporting the Chief Engineer in his 
role as the Engineering Technical Authority for the 
Agency, reporting to the Administrator.  The NESC is a 
distributed virtual organization, with the Director and 
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 management offices located at the NASA Langley 
Research Center (LaRC) and permanently assigned 
technical personnel located at each of the other NASA 
Centers.  The NESC operates in a “tiger-team” model 
when conducting studies and assessments, forming a 
dedicated team of subject matter experts to address a 
well-defined technical issue. 
 
2.1 Organization 
 
The NESC is organized into five complimentary 
functional offices. 
 
1) Principal Engineers Office, providing study leadership 
and management, particularly for longer term, 
multidisciplinary assessments.  The office is currently 
staffed by three Principal Engineers and one Associate 
Principal Engineer at LaRC, one Principal Engineer at 
NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC), and two Associate 
Principal Engineers, one located at NASA Marshall 
Space Flight Center (MSFC), and the other at NASA 
White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). 
 
2) NESC Chief Engineers Office, one at each of the ten 
NASA field centers to be the “eyes and ears” for the 
NESC and provide a conduit for alternative opinions.  
The NESC Chief Engineers track program and project 
technical progress and risks at their respective Centers, 
help identify and facilitate assignment of subject matter 
experts to support NESC teams, and manage pre-
positioned resources to ensure ready and timely support. 
NESC Chief Engineers also lead assessments suited to 
their technical interests and capabilities. 
 
3) NASA Technical Fellows Office, currently staffed by 
eighteen NASA Technical Fellows, each recognized by 
NASA as a technical leader in their specific discipline.  
They, along with the NESC Chief Scientist and the NESC 
Chief Astronaut, each maintains a technical discipline 
team consisting of experienced subject matter experts 
from other NASA Centers, U.S. Government Agencies, 
academia, and industry. These technical teams are often 
the source of subject matter expertise supporting NESC 
studies.  The NASA Technical Fellows often lead 
discipline specific NESC assessments, however; recently 
the role of Technical Fellow has expanded to include an 
Agency-Level capability leadership role.  The capability 
leadership role is to help ensure NASA has the necessary 
capability in each discipline, including people, facilities, 
and tools, for future missions and programs.  As a result, 
each NASA Technical Fellow has one or more Deputies 
to assist with their responsibilities. Fig. 1 lists the 19 
current technical discipline teams, with a new one for 
Sensors and Instrumentation in the process of being 
formed. Fig. 2 shows the typcial annual affiliation of 
subject matter experts participating on NESC Technical 
Discipline Teams. 
 
4) The NESC Integration Office (NIO, formerly the 
Systems Engineering Office) provides technical 
integration and coordination between the NESC and the 
major NASA Program and Project Offices, and 
administers the NESC Review Board review and 
approval processes.  The technical integration function 
has become increasingly important and complex as 
NASA’s current major development programs are 
completing design and beginning hardware build and 
test. 
 
5) The Management and Technical Support Office 
(MTSO) provides financial, budgetary, and procurement 
support for the NESC.  The ability of NESC study teams 
to form and respond quickly to urgent technical issues is 
dependent on the ready-access procurement instruments 
and pre-positioned resources managed by this office.  
The MTSO also provides contract technical editing, 
project logistics and coordination support, and audio and 
video services to support NESC assessments. 
 
2.2 NESC Review Board 
 
NESC Principal Engineers, NESC Center Chief 
Engineers, NESC assigned NASA Technical Fellows, the 
NESC Chief Scientist and Chief Astronaut, the Deputy 
Director for Safety, the Heads of the MTSO and NIO, and 
the Deputy Director and the Director of the NESC  are 
voting members of the NESC Review Board (NRB).  The 
NRB evaluates and approves each technical study and 
plan, monitors assessment progress, and reviews and 
approves the final report and recommendations to ensure 
technical rigor and accuracy.  The NRB meets 
approximately weekly, and voting members attend in 
person or via web-video links. 
 
The NRB decides on accepting new studies or 
assessments according to the following priorities 
 
1. Technical support of projects in the flight phase 
2. Technical support of projects in the design phase 
3. Known problems not being addressed by any project 
4. Work to avoid potential future problems 
5. Work to improve a system  
 
2.3 Technical Reports 
In the CAIB final report, NASA was criticized for lack 
of technical reports supporting many Space Shuttle 
technical decisions and rationales.  In many cases, the 
only source of documentation was view-graph 
presentation materials, which did not contain the 
technical data and analysis details to reconstruct 
conclusions or recommendations.  During formulation of 
the NESC, this shortcoming was clearly noted, and the 
NESC adopted as a core value documenting all studies 
 and assessments with technical, peer-reviewed final 
reports.   
 
Final reports are required for any assessment containing 
NESC performed independent analyses and/or testing, 
and must fully document models, analyses and 
assumptions, test articles, test procedures, test data, and 
conclusions and recommendations.  Conclusions and 
recommendations are written in terms of Findings, 
Observations, and Recommendations (FORs).  A finding 
is a relevant fact derived from analyses or tests, and an 
observation is a technical statement or opinion that could 
or should be of interest to the project requester, but not 
necessarily strictly derived from the tests or analyses.  
Recommendations are statements, directly traceable to 
one or more specific findings or observations, of the 
action or position the NESC recommends the project 
adopt.  Each final report is peer-review internally and 
externally to the NESC, and receives final scrutiny and 
approval from the NESC Review Board before 
publication.  Since in some cases, assessment results 
must be delivered to the requester before the final report 
is complete, the NESC Review Board may also review 
and approve FORs separately from the report, with the 
expectation that they are final and will not change. 
 
In some cases where the NESC does not perform 
independent analyses or tests, but instead reviews 
existing technical documentation or provides direct 
technical support to a project, resulting NESC opinions 
or recommendations may be documented as a “white 
paper”, also approved by the NESC Review Board. 
 
Depending on any distribution restrictions, for example 
due to export control laws or proprietary contents, the 
NESC publishes each report through the NASA 
publication system with appropriate availability.  The 
NESC maintains a cadre of technical writers and 
configuration control specialists to assist with and 
manage the technical report process. 
 
2.4 Individual and Team Recognition 
The NESC recognizes that the individual subject matter 
experts, acting separately and as part of the assessment 
team, are the key to NESC operations.  Without the 
ability to identify, recruit, and support highly skilled and 
capable technical experts external to the NESC, the 
NESC could not be effective, timely, or value-added.  
Because of this, the NESC has established its own annual 
recognition (awards) program to ensure that key 
individuals and teams are recognized for the impact their 
work makes.  Awards are given for Leadership, 
Engineering Excellence, Administrative Excellence, and 
Group Achievement.  The highest award, the Directors 
Award, is given to an individual that takes personal 
accountability and ownership of a controversial technical 
issue. 
 
3. SIGNIFICANT MISSION SUPPORT 
The technical studies conducted by the NESC are 
typically performed at the request of NASA 
management, program or project managers, project 
technical leads, and Center engineering organization 
leadership.  However, the NESC also maintains an online 
presence for requests that bypass normal program or 
organizational reporting and chains-of-command to 
ensure alternative technical opinions can be made known 
and independently evaluated. 
 
Fig. 3 shows the historical breakdown for the source of 
the assessment request, and Fig. 4 shows, by year, the 
number of assessments supporting each of the major 
NASA Mission Directorates.  Evident in Fig.4 is the 
long-term annual average number of assessments, 
slightly over 50, or about one per week.  Since inception, 
the NESC has accepted 684 of 1122 assessment requests, 
completed 583, and has 101 either currently active or in 
final report preparation and closeout. 
 
A comprehensive listing of all active and completed 
NESC assessments is beyond the limits of this paper; 
however, the list of current assessments below is 
representative of NESC mission support assessments. 
 
 CubeSat Radiation Environments and ISS 
(International Space Station) Radiation Dose 
Data 
 Additive Manufacturing Structural Integrity 
Initiative 
 Burst Factor Assessment for Pressure Vessels 
 (Electronic) Parts-level vs. Board-level and 
Box-level Screening Testing 
 JWST (James Webb Space Telescope) Space 
Environment Launch Constraints 
 Wear Resistant Titanium Bearing Technology 
for Spacesuits 
 Independent Crew Vibration and Shock 
Requirements and Compliance Assessment 
 Commercial Crew Aerodynamics Peer Review 
 Review of the Orion-ESM  (European Service 
Module) Interfaces 
 
4. RISK REDUCTION AND EXTERNAL 
PROJECTS 
The NESC, in addition to assessments addressing near-
term mission needs, has undertaken several large-scale, 
risk-reduction projects for major NASA programs that, 
for one reason or another, the program could not 
undertake on its own.  These projects include the Max 
Launch Abort System (MLAS), the Composite Crew 
Module (CCM), and Shell Buckling Knockdown Factor 
(SBKF) projects, among others.  Each of these projects 
 required the design, development, and test of full-scale 
hardware over several years. 
 
The NESC undertook the Max Launch Abort System 
project to develop and flight-test an alternative launch 
abort (escape) system design, as compared to NASA’s 
traditional tower-based design used during Projects 
Mercury and Apollo.  This design was risk-reduction for 
the Orion escape system, which at the time was 
experiencing development delays.  This project defined a 
passively stable, aerodynamic faired, side-mounted 
rocket motor configuration as a potential drop-in 
replacement for the Orion Launch Abort System (LAS).  
With the configuration defined, the project designed and 
built full-scale flight hardware to confirm the stability 
characteristics during a pad-abort type scenario.  The 
flight test vehicle launched on July 8, 2009 at the NASA 
Wallops Flight Test Facility, as shown in Fig. 5(a).  Post-
flight data analysis showed good agreement with pre-
flight prediction [1]. 
 
The NESC performed a second risk-reduction project for 
Orion in the same period, investigating the potential use 
of composite materials for the Orion crew-module 
pressure vessel.  The Composite Crew Module designed, 
sized, and built a full-scale pressure vessel including 
hatches, mounting blocks, and access ports, Fig. 5b.  The 
NESC tested the fully instrumented composite pressure 
vessel to failure in 2009 at the NASA Langley Research 
Center [2]. 
 
A third risk-reduction project, still on going, is 
addressing shell buckling design-knockdown factors for 
orthogrid launch vehicle tanks. A knockdown factor 
reduces the analytical tank design stiffness in order to 
account for material and geometric imperfections and 
defects that can affect buckling loads and behaviour. This 
project has tested sub-scale and full-scale tank shell 
structures at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center.  
The objective is to validate buckling prediction methods 
for tank structures, and identify and reduce knockdown 
value conservatism, leading to lighter weight tank 
structures.  Fig. 5(c) shows the full-scale test setup, along 
with equipment supporting a high-resolution, surface-
deflection photogrammetry measurement system.  This 
risk-reduction project will benefit future NASA launch 
vehicle developments projects [3]. 
 
The NESC, on occasion, also participates in or conducts 
technical or safety-related assessments for requestors 
outside of NASA.  The reason for these requests vary, 
ranging from the need for total independence from 
another U.S. Government Agency, or because of the 
NESC capability to form subject matter expert teams 
quickly. Significant examples of NESC led outside 
assessments include 
 
 Toyota Un-Intended Acceleration Study for the 
National Highway Transportation Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) [4], looking for 
latent hardware or software faults that could 
lead to sudden, un-commanded accelerations. 
 Chilean Miners Rescue [5], in which the NESC 
over several days assembled an expert team of 
human factors, physiology, and structural 
designers to write requirements for the rescue 
capsule. 
 
In each of these cases, the NESC assessment provide 
needed, un-biased or time-critical technical data on 
issues of national or international public concern. 
 
5. FUTURE CHALLENGES 
In recent years, the NESC’s human spaceflight focused 
activities have changed from Shuttle Return-to-Flight, 
completion of the International Space Station (ISS), and 
major operational science missions such as the Hubble 
Space Telescope.  Today the focus is much more directed 
to the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Module (MPCV), 
Space Launch System (SLS), Ground Systems 
Development and Operations (GSDO), Commercial 
Crew Program (CCP), and James Webb Space Telescope 
(JWST) design, integration, test, and certification 
activities.  For these programs, the identification and 
resolution of technical issues must come early enough in 
the development cycle to influence design decisions 
and/or minimize cascading system-level or architecture 
interactions.  To do so, the NESC must engage directly 
with program engineering teams, but must also maintain 
independence in case of major technical disagreements or 
apparent compromises to safety or mission success 
requiring elevation to NASA senior management. 
 
A lesson-learned from NESC engagement with the 
predecessor Constellation development program was that 
creating complex flight, guidance, control, avionics, 
structural, and/or aerodynamics models and simulations 
independent of program efforts requires long-lead times. 
Independently developed models allows the NESC to 
challenge modeling assumptions, implementation, and 
interpretation of results, which is not possible if the 
NESC must rely on the program developed models 
because of time criticality.  Consequently, the NESC has 
undertaken a long-term modeling and simulation effort to 
develop several key simulation capabilities in parallel to 
program efforts, specifically a comprehensive flight 
dynamics/controls/flexibility/slosh model of the SLS, 
and an entry/descent/landing model adaptable to either 
CCP provider.   In this manner, the NESC models can be 
compared and validated with program or contractor 
models to ensure proper capture of system physics, but 
still be based on independent assumptions, tools, and 
techniques. 
 
 Farther in the future, Orion, SLS, CCP partners, and 
JWST will transition from development to flight 
operations.  While an operational focus is more like the 
NESCs original role, the number of flight programs, the 
change in mission types, and, in the case of the CCP 
partners, commercial operations, will further challenge 
the NESC to adapt. 
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Figure 1.  List of NESC Technical Discipline Teams 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2. Affiliation of NESC Technical Team Membership, 2015 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Historical Breakdown of Assessment Request Source 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Historical Breakdown of NASA Mission Directorate Support 
  
  
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 5.  Major NESC Risk Reduction Projects (a) Max Launch Abort System, (b) Composite Crew Module, (c) Shell 
Buckling Knockdown Factor
 
